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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have observed that a key characteristic of the Asian Pacific 
American experience has been the presumption of foreignness, that Asians are not 
“real” Americans no matter how long they have lived in the United States, or how 
well they appear to have assimilated into mainstream culture.1 As these scholars 
have noted, all Asians, as Asians, were targeted by the Asian Exclusion Laws that 
built on the Chinese Exclusion Act, and all Asians, as Asians, were burdened by 
the racial restrictions on naturalization that were in federal law between 1790 to 
1952, and the restrictions on immigration in force between 1882 and 1965.2 They 
also note the contributions of high and popular U.S. culture to the idea that 
Asians were not real Americans, and were somehow ineradicably foreign. 
This scholarship focuses on group categorization and stereotype, arguing 
that classes such as “the Chinese,” “Orientals,” or “Asians” were classified by or 
denigrated socially in particular ways. This Article addresses several legal aspects 
of the presumption of foreignness as they applied not only to groups, but also to 
particular individuals of Asian racial background. While some of these have been 
written about before, others have not been given their full due. 
By common law and statute, the law of evidence discriminated against 
Asians in various ways. Part I addresses the special treatment of Asians as 
witnesses in immigration and other cases.3 State and federal courts and legislatures 
treated Asian testimony as less credible, or made it incompetent entirely. Part II 
addresses legal presumptions about the citizenship of Asians.4 State and federal 
courts required persons of Asian racial ancestry, and only them, to prove that they 
were citizens in the context of statutes imposing restrictions on Asians. The law 
thus used negative attitudes about Asian Americans to disadvantage them in 
 
1. See, e.g., FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 79–129 
(2002); Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and 
Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 21–40 (1996); Anupam Chander, Diaspora 
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1024–25, 1025 n.101 (2001); Robert S. Chang, Closing Essay: Developing 
a Collective Memory to Imagine a Better Future, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1607 (2002); Neil Gotanda, New 
Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 38–41 (2010); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed 
Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11,  
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: 
Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 270–78, 289–311 
(1997); Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of “Foreignness” in the Construction  
of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71 (1997); Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens  
and Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1595, 1617 (2005) (“The foreignness essential to the racialization 
of Asian Americans has operated to vitiate the notion that Asian Americans stand at the center of 
national membership.” (footnote omitted)). 
2. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional 
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13–15, 19–22, 26–50 (1998); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights 
Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C.  
L. REV. 273, 280–82, 286, 291–94 (1996) [hereinafter Chin, Civil Rights Revolution]. 
3. See infra Part I. 
4. See infra Part II. 
2013] “A CHINAMAN’S CHANCE” IN COURT 967 
 
concrete ways. Not only were their substantive rights diminished, but also their 
ability to protect the rights they retained under law was made more challenging. 
I. ASIANS AS UNTRUSTWORTHY WITNESSES 
A. Competency and Credibility Under State Law 
1. Incompetency 
Continuing and expanding the tradition in American law of discriminating 
against African American witnesses,5 the California Crimes and Punishments Act 
of 1850 provided that “[n]o black or mulatto person, or Indian, shall be permitted 
to give evidence in favor of, or against, any white person.”6 As a matter of 
textualism, this statute would seem inapplicable to Asians, who are simply 
unmentioned. But in People v. Hall in 1854,7 the California Supreme Court held 
that the phrase “black person” “must be taken as contradistinguished from white, 
and necessarily excludes all races other than the Caucasian.”8 Accordingly, a white 
man convicted of murder based on Chinese testimony was entitled to a new trial. 
Perhaps recognizing that the textual point was debatable (one of the three 
justices dissented without opinion), the panel explained that, “even in a doubtful 
case, we would be impelled to this decision on grounds of public policy.”9 The 
court warned that allowing Chinese to testify would imply possession of other civil 
rights: 
 
5. 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 226 (1858) (“One of the consequences of the want of liberty in the slave is his 
disqualification to be a witness in cases affecting the rights of freemen.”); Gilbert Thomas 
Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 869, 873–78 (1909). 
6. Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, § 14, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229, 230, amended by Act of Mar. 18, 1863, 
ch. 70, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69, 69, repealed by Act of Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 48, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 488, 489. 
It went on to decree that “[e]very person who shall have one eighth part or more of Negro blood 
shall be deemed a mulatto, and every person who shall have one half of Indian blood shall be deemed 
an Indian.” Id. This statute and its civil counterpart were impliedly repealed by the 1872 Penal Code 
and Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1321 (1872); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1880 
(1874). See generally People v. McGuire, 45 Cal. 56, 57 (1872) (per curiam) (“[T]he Legislature, by the 
passage of the Codes, has repealed all laws which exclude Chinamen from testifying in actions to 
which white men are parties.”) The Revised Laws of the State of California, a draft not enacted into 
law but which formed the basis of the 1872 codes, retained the disqualification in part in the Penal 
Code and in full in the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1880(3) (1871); 4 REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 
PENAL CODE § 1321 (1871) (“Except in cases of homicide, or when the offence was committed upon 
his person or property, no Mongolian, Chinese, Indian or person having one-half of Indian blood, is a 
competent witness in any criminal action or proceeding.”). 
7. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854). 
8. Id. at 404. 
9. Id. 
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  The same rule which would admit them to testify, would admit them 
to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon see them at the 
polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls. 
  This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-heated 
imagination of the patriot and statesman, but it is an actual and present 
danger.10 
The court had clear opinions on the character of Chinese immigrants in the 
United States: 
The anomalous spectacle of a distinct people, living in our community, 
recognizing no laws of this State, except through necessity, bringing with 
them their prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open 
violation of law; . . . whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of people 
whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress 
or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has 
shown; differing in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; 
between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable difference, 
is now presented, and for them is claimed, not only the right to swear 
away the life of a citizen, but the further privilege of participating with us 
in administering the affairs of our Government.11 
People v. Hall looks like an example of judicial activism through dramatic 
expansion of the language of the statute, but the California Supreme Court 
correctly predicted the views of the legislature. In 1863, agreeing that Asians 
should not be witnesses, the legislature amended the statute to read: “No Indian, 
or person having one half or more of Indian blood, or Mongolian or Chinese, 
shall be permitted to give evidence in favor or against any white person.”12 As of 
1863, then, African Americans were allowed to testify freely in California—
perhaps a nod to the changes being brought about by the Civil War. But the rights 
of Chinese were restricted, and not just Chinese but also other “Mongolians.”13 
In 1870, the California Supreme Court rejected a claim that the recently 
enacted Fourteenth Amendment invalidated California’s testimonial 
disqualification.14 It explained that the Constitution did not require the admission 
of evidence that would not help achieve justice: 
The theory of the law . . . [is] that every person shall be permitted to 
 
10. Id. at 404–05. 
11. Id. at 405. 
12. Act of Mar. 18, 1863, ch. 70, § 14, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69, 69 (amending Act of Apr. 16, 1850, 
ch. 99, § 14, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229, 230) (repealed 1955). The prohibition applied in civil cases as well.  
See Speer v. See Yup Co., 13 Cal. 73 (1859). 
13. Other legal materials suggest that “Mongolians” include more than just Chinese. See, e.g.,  
In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (“A person of the Mongolian race, either Chinese or 
Japanese, cannot be naturalized . . . .”); In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 126 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (“The Japanese, 
like the Chinese, belong to the Mongolian race . . . .”); cf. Roldan v. L.A. Cnty., 18 P.2d 706 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a Filipino person is “Malay,” not Mongolian). 
14. People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198, 210–11 (1870). 
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testify who can aid the Court in coming to a correct conclusion as to the 
facts upon which it is to adjudicate. The reason why the testimony of 
such persons would be valueless in judicial investigations may be that 
they are incapable of testifying intelligently; that they are too unreliable to 
be of any service; that their admission would probably defeat justice by 
producing false testimony, or that they have particular prejudices against 
certain classes which would cause their evidence likely to do harm where 
the rights of such persons are concerned; such evidence, it is presumed, 
would impede rather than advance the cause of justice. It would not tend 
to protect any, but might cause the conviction of the innocent, or the 
acquittal of the guilty . . . . [T]his is what the Legislature have decided, 
and had a right to decide, in enacting the law.15 
Chinese were incompetent, then, not because of prejudice or discrimination, but 
based on pure rationality and to ensure fairness. 
In his magisterial treatise on evidence, John H. Wigmore reported that “[n]o 
statutory exclusion of the Chinese race as witnesses seems ever to have obtained 
in any State law except that of California . . . .”16 This is somewhat misleading; in 
fact, California was a leader in the area. In 1865, the Arizona Territory borrowed 
from and expanded California’s law,17 disqualifying any “black or mulato, [sic] or 
Indian, Mongolian or Asiatic” from testifying for or against a white person.18 
California Chief Justice and future federal judge Lorenzo Sawyer recognized 
the consequences of creating a group that could be victimized with practical legal 
impunity: 
In the nature of things, it would seem, that the very fact of the existence 
in our midst of a large class of people, upon whom crimes can be 
committed without fear of detection or conviction, and, therefore, with 
impunity, must tend to encourage the commission of crimes upon that 
class . . . .19 
He feared that, “in due time, more hardened and experienced reprobates will 
graduate to exercise their skill upon a wider field of criminal enterprise.”20 But this 
worry was not enough to make him invalidate the law. 
The tradition of restricting the admissibility of testimony based on race 
ended in the states with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1870, § 16 of 
which is now 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).21 It provides: “[A]ll persons within the 
 
15. Id. at 211. 
16. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 516, at 931 (2d ed. 1923). 
17. Admittedly, Arizona was then a territory rather than a state, so Wigmore was technically 
correct. 
18. Act of Nov. 10, 1864, § 14, 1865 Howell Code Az. 50, 50 (repealed 1871). 
19. People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 566, 574 (1867). 
20. Id. 
21. Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 144, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at  
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006)). 
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jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to . . . give evidence . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”22 As Justice 
White persuasively explained in Runyon v. McCrary, this section was introduced in 
Congress in 1870 because of the need to “protect Chinese aliens.”23 Commenting 
on the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1981(a) in 1887, one author described, 
“what will doubtless be accepted as the true rule, viz. that Chinese persons are, 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States guaranteeing to them ‘the 
equal protection of the laws,’ competent witnesses.”24 
And indeed, research has uncovered no instances of testimonial 
incompetency in state courts after the early 1870s. Cutting off what could have 
been an easy subterfuge, several courts held that Chinese witnesses’s religious 
beliefs were not sufficient to render them incompetent.25 Japanese people were 
also held competent.26 In State v. Lem Woon, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to 
allow impeachment based on “the revengeful disposition of the Chinese people as 
a race” rather than some characteristic of the individual.27 The court noted that 
such a principle would set “a dangerous precedent” because it logically could not 
be limited to Chinese: 
[A] rule that would admit evidence of such characteristics or customs of a 
class or a race to affect the credibility of an individual witness of that 
class or race cannot apply to the Chinese more than to the Negro, Indian, 
or any other people who practice them. This characteristic of the 
Chinese, if it does exist among them, is probably out-classed by family or 
neighborhood feuds existing to this day in certain localities in our own 
country, where wrongs of generations ago are still being avenged.28 
2. Credibility 
It is clear that fact finders did not treat Chinese testimony as on a par with 
that of a citizen. As one expert explained: “Chinese and other oriental races, are 
recognized as having little regard for the obligation of an oath, but their testimony 
may not be arbitrarily rejected.”29 Courts frequently noted the race of witnesses, 
 
22. Id. 
23. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 200 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). See generally Charles J. 
McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850–1870, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (1984) (“[S]ection 1981 derives from section 16 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1870, a statute that was not designed—at least not in any primary sense—to promote the civil 
rights of the nation’s newly emancipated black citizens, but rather to respond to the plight of another 
aggrieved racial minority—the Chinese of California.”). 
24. STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WITNESSES § 24, at 28 (1887). 
25. E.g., People v. Lim Foon, 155 P. 477, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915); Green v. State, 
71 Ga. 487, 493 (1883); Territory v. Yee Shun, 2 P. 84, 85 (N.M. 1884). 
26. Pumphrey v. State, 122 N.W. 19, 20 (Neb. 1909). 
27. State v. Lem Woon, 107 P. 974, 978 (Or. 1910). 
28. Id. 
29. 14 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EVIDENCE 159 (Edgar W. Camp ed., 1909) (footnotes 
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seemingly giving more credibility to facts supported by white witnesses;30 indeed, 
Asian criminal defendants sometimes won appellate reversals if juries rejected 
exculpatory testimony of white witnesses.31 In 1896, the California Supreme Court 
found no error in the prosecutor’s argument “in substance, that the jury should 
disregard the testimony of all the Chinese witnesses in support of an alibi, as 
against the testimony of the white witnesses for the prosecution; and that the 
testimony of Chinese witnesses, unless corroborated by white witnesses, was 
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .”32 
Oregon had a special cross-examination rule for Chinese witnesses, at least 
where the defendant was Chinese and charged with murder. In State v. Mah Jim,33 
the Oregon Supreme Court was apparently concerned that the defendant had 
been framed for a murder committed by other people. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that there should have been greater leeway for cross-examination to 
uncover the plot. Said the court: 
 
omitted); see also In re Shong Toon, 21 F. 386, 392 (D. Cal. 1884) (noting that the court was 
“[p]rofoundly impressed . . . with the unreliability of Chinese testimony in general”); In re Woman’s N. 
Pac. Presbyterian Bd. of Missions, 22 P. 1105, 1109 (Or. 1890) (overturning a trial court order 
awarding custody of Chinese children to their grandmother based on the unreliability of Chinese 
testimony: “Chinamen, such as we have among us, can rarely be trusted in such matters, however 
bland and plausible they may appear. Those of the race who have come to this coast have generally 
exhibited a total disregard of virtue, candor, and integrity, and have shown such a propensity to 
cunning, deception, and perfidy that, if they were to engage in an effort to accomplish an apparently 
meritorious object, a strong suspicion would arise that there was some covert, sinister scheme at the 
bottom of it.”); Chiou-Ling Yeh, The Chinese “Are a Race that Cannot Be Believed”: Jury Impaneling and 
Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century California, 24 W. LEGAL HISTORY 1 (2011) (discussing attitudes of 
prospective jurors toward Chinese witnesses). But see United States v. Lee Yung, 63 F. 520, 521 (S.D. 
Cal. 1894) (refusing to deport a defendant based on his brief trip to Mexico; noting that he was “what 
is termed an ‘Americanized Chinaman,’ having adopted the Christian religion and American manners 
of dress and living,” and had “a high reputation for truthfulness and reliability”). 
30. See, e.g., People v. Chin Non, 80 P. 681, 682 (Cal. 1905) (“All the witnesses, white and 
Chinese alike, testify to these facts, making it a clear case of deliberate murder.”); People v. Fong Sing, 
175 P. 911, 914 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918) (“[W]e cannot perceive how the excluded testimony could 
have added any more support to the alibi theory than it derived from the testimony of an 
unimpeached white witness.”); People v. Ah Wing, 169 P. 402, 405 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (“The 
evidence of his guilt is quite clear from the testimony of white witnesses.”); State v. Ah Chuey, 
14 Nev. 79, 92–93 (1879) (noting that key facts were “shown by the testimony of white witnesses”); 
see also infra notes 65–66. 
31. People v. Un Dong, 39 P. 12, 13 (Cal. 1895) (“On the part of defendant, a large number 
of Chinese witnesses, and some white witnesses, gave testimony tending strongly to show that 
defendant was not present at the time of the assault, and did not participate therein.”); People 
v. Singh, 53 P.2d 403, 405 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (“A conclusive alibi was established in behalf of 
Sansar Singh which requires a reversal of the judgment with respect to him. Eight white witnesses 
testified to facts which are undisputed . . . .”); see also People v. Green, 34 P. 231, 232 (Cal. 1893) 
(reversing a conviction for robbery of a Chinese person because the trial court limited closing 
arguments to one hour per side, and, as evidence of the closeness and complexity of the case, noting 
that “[t]his testimony of five white witnesses on the part of the defendant was irreconcilably 
inconsistent with that of the three Chinamen who had testified in chief on the part of the people”). 
32. People v. Foo, 44 P. 453, 455–56 (Cal. 1896). 
33. State v. Mah Jim, 10 P. 306 (Or. 1886). 
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Experience convinces every one that the testimony of Chinese witnesses 
is very unreliable, and that they are apt to be actuated by motives that are 
not honest. The life of a human being should not be forfeited on that 
character of evidence without a full opportunity to sift it thoroughly.34 
The court explained that the Chinese witnesses “may have been attempting 
to carry out a diabolical design,—no one can tell what that class of persons may 
have in view.”35 Because Chinese practices “are very peculiar and mysterious,” 
courts should not “adopt a refined, technical rule as to the admission of evidence 
tending to show what their motives may be.”36 
Two years later, the Oregon court reversed another conviction on the same 
ground. In State v. Ching Ling,37 the court explained: 
In cases of homicide among these Chinamen, it is almost impossible to 
ascertain who the guilty parties are. I am satisfied that they will not 
hesitate to conspire, and make those answerable for outrages who had no 
hand in perpetrating them. It behooves courts and juries, in the trial of 
these people for capital offenses, where the evidence of their guilt 
depends mainly upon the testimony of their own kind, to be prudent, 
vigilant, and discriminating; otherwise they are liable to be made use of as 
a means to carry out the machinations of the crafty and designing.38 
The court explained that there were multiple reasons for the policy: 
Juries should be loth to convict a Chinaman of murder in the first degree 
upon Chinese testimony, not wholly on account of a tender regard for 
the life of the accused, but also from a respect and reverence for truth 
and justice. If we were disposed, through a dislike of the race, to consider 
the life of a Chinaman as a trivial matter, still we would have no right to 
immolate justice upon the altar of our prejudice.39 
B. Chinese Witnesses Under Federal Law 
Treatment of Chinese witnesses under federal law was another matter; there 
was no pretense of equal treatment from the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
to the middle of the twentieth. Beginning in 1882, Congress restricted the 
immigration of Chinese.40 Over time, Congress passed a series of statutes 
requiring racial evidence when dealing with Chinese.41 The Supreme Court 
uniformly upheld these special requirements.42 Under these laws, Chinese 
 
34. Id. at 306–07. 
35. Id. at 307. 
36. Id. 
37. State v. Ching Ling, 18 P. 844 (Or. 1888). 
38. Id. at 847. 
39. Id. 
40. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (suspending the admittance of Chinese 
laborers into the United States) (repealed 1943). 
41. See infra notes 43–47, 57, 60–61 and accompanying text.  
42. See infra notes 48–49, 51–52, 54, 56, 58, 68–69 and accompanying text. 
2013] “A CHINAMAN’S CHANCE” IN COURT 973 
 
witnesses were subject both to rules of absolute incompetency and to 
impeachment based on race, and claims based on their testimony were subject to 
enhanced burdens of proof. 
1. Incompetency 
In several contexts, testimony of Chinese witnesses was deemed incompetent 
to prove particular points. Exclusion was based on a belief that Chinese were not 
credible. 
a. Residence certificates 
In 1892, Congress amended the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act to require that 
Chinese laborers lawfully present in the United States obtain and carry a residence 
card43 on penalty of a year of hard labor and deportation.44 A Chinese person 
found without his residence card was subject to a trial to determine his status.45 
Testimony of a “credible white witness” was necessary to establish the individual’s 
lawful residence.46 In 1893, Congress amended the statute to require “at least one 
credible witness other than Chinese.”47 
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the registration 
requirement and its evidentiary limitation.48 The Court explained that 
governments were free to discriminate against witnesses on the basis of race: 
[T]he requirement of proof, “by at least one credible white witness, that 
he was a resident of the United States at the time of the passage of this 
act,” is within the acknowledged power of every legislature to prescribe 
the evidence which shall be received, and the effect of that  
evidence . . . .49 
But what of the Voting Rights Act of 1870, prohibiting racial discrimination 
against witnesses?50 The Court in Fong Yue Ting held that “[t]he competency of all 
witnesses, without regard to their color, to testify . . . rests on acts of Congress, 
which Congress may at its discretion modify or repeal.”51 Congress was within its 
authority in “not allowing such a fact to be proved solely by the testimony of 
aliens in a like situation, or of the same race.”52 In the period before the rise of 
modern equal protection jurisprudence, the Court did not hold that Congress had 
 
43. Geary Act, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25–26 (1892) (repealed 1943). 
44. Id. § 4. 
45. Id. § 6. 
46. Id. 
47. Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, §6, 28 Stat. 7 (repealed 1943). 
48. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893). 
49. Id. (quoting § 6 of the Geary Act). 
50. Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 144, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144, (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006)). 
51. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729. 
52. Id. at 730. 
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the same obligation as did states to treat people equally.53 There was, therefore, no 
compelling doctrinal argument that the Constitution restricted Congress’s actions 
in making rules of evidence. 
Beyond this technical point, the Court seemed to recognize that Chinese 
witnesses were generally untrustworthy. Allowing Chinese to testify, which had 
been permitted under the prior version of the Chinese Exclusion Act, “was 
attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious nature, in many instances, 
of the testimony offered to establish the residence of the parties, arising from the 
loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath.”54 
Exclusion of testimony based on race did not go uncriticized. Wigmore, for 
example, stated that “the supposed special danger of perjury by Chinese 
attempting to evade those statutes of exile was precisely what might be expected 
from the people of any country when a hostile measure is attempted to be 
enforced by the harshest means.”55 
b. Returning merchants 
Merchants had certain privileges under the Chinese Exclusion laws. Unlike 
laborers, they were not absolutely excluded from reentry into the United States 
after leaving. Thus, merchants in the United States could leave and return. This 
statute was no obscurity; the Court mentioned, interpreted, or applied the 
exception for merchants in at least eleven decisions.56 
For this special status, one white witness was insufficient to establish a 
Chinese merchant’s status, and thus their right to reentry. In 1893, Congress 
provided that, to be allowed to land, a returning merchant “shall establish by the 
testimony of two credible witnesses other than Chinese the fact that he conducted 
such business . . . for at least one year before his departure from the United 
States.”57 The Court upheld the statute against an equal protection attack on the 
 
53. See La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (“The Fifth 
Amendment has no equal protection clause . . . .”). 
54. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 
598 (1889)). Thus, even if it caused hardship, courts applied the law rigorously. See, e.g., United States 
v. Williams, 83 F. 997, 999 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (“It may be that the law, in making the defendant, or 
any one of his race, incompetent as a witness to prove such fact [i.e., lawful residence], works in this 
particular case a hardship; but the court cannot, for this reason, suspend its operation.”). 
55. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 931. 
56. Nagle v. Loi Hoa, 275 U.S. 475, 476 (1928); Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336, 
343–46, (1925); Yee Won v. White, 256 U.S. 399, 399–400 (1921); White v. Chin Fong, 253 U.S. 90, 
92–93 (1920); Chin Fong v. Backus, 241 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1916); Tom Hong v. United States, 193 U.S. 
517, 520–23 (1904); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168, 169, 176 (1902); Li Sing v. United States, 
180 U.S. 486, 493–95 (1901); United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 460–61, 463–64, 466–68 
(1900); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546 (1895); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 
U.S. 47, 62–64 (1892); see also Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U.S. 258, 264–66 (1923) 
(applying the merchant exception to the Philippines during the period when it was a U.S. 
commonwealth). 
57. Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, § 2, 28 Stat. 7, 8 (repealed 1943). White witnesses also had to 
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authority of Fong Yue Ting, explaining: “We cannot . . . yield to the earnest 
contention made in behalf of inoffensive Chinese persons who seek to come 
within the limits of the United States and subject themselves to their jurisdiction, 
by modifying or relaxing, by judicial construction, the severity of the statutes 
under consideration.”58 
c. Pharmacy workers in China 
A final special restriction on Chinese credibility remains in the United States 
Code as of 2013. 21 U.S.C. § 201 is part of the system of regulation of the practice 
of pharmacy and the sale of medicine in the United States consular districts in 
China, which have been defunct since 1943.59 The statute places a special 
limitation on Chinese subjects working in U.S.-licensed pharmacies in China: 
Where it is necessary for a [licensee] . . . to employ Chinese subjects to 
compound, dispense, or sell at retail any drug, medicine, or poison, such 
[licensee] . . . may employ such Chinese subjects when their character, 
ability, and age of twenty-one years or over have been certified to by at 
least two recognized and reputable practitioners of medicine, or two 
pharmacists licensed under this chapter whose permanent allegiance is 
due to the United States.60 
That is, Chinese subjects, but not U.S. citizens or other foreigners, must 
demonstrate their good character. And, because Chinese were prohibited from 
naturalizing and becoming U.S. citizens until 1943, for practical purposes, no 
person of Chinese ancestry could testify when this law had operative force. 
Violation of the law is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.61 
2. Credibility 
To the extent that Chinese testimony went to legal issues and questions not 
mentioned in the statutes, it was not technically incompetent, and was therefore 
admissible.62 Thus, while a Chinese person seeking admission had to prove that he 
was a merchant through witnesses other than Chinese, federal courts held that a 
Chinese person already in the United States could use Chinese testimony to prove 
 
prove “that during such year [the merchant] was not engaged in the performance of any manual labor, 
except such as was necessary in the conduct of his business as such merchant.” Id. 
58. Li Sing, 180 U.S. at 495. 
59. See U.S., Britain Give Up Extra China Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1943, at 4 (describing the 
treaty ending American extraterritorial jurisdiction within China). 
60. 21 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
61. Id. § 212. 
62. See, e.g., In re Tung Yeong, 19 F. 184, 190 (D. Cal. 1884) (“Chinese persons, in common 
with all others, have the right ‘to the equal protection of the laws,’ and this includes the right ‘to give 
evidence’ in courts. A Chinese person is therefore a competent witness. To reject his testimony when 
consistent with itself, and wholly uncontradicted by other proofs, on the sole ground that he is a 
Chinese person, would be an evasion, or rather violation, of the constitution and law which every one 
who sets a just value upon the uprightness and independence of the judiciary, would deeply deplore.”). 
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merchant status as a defense to a deportation action.63 Also, no special evidentiary 
requirements attached to a claim that a person of Chinese racial ancestry was born 
in the United States. This was quite consequential, because entry as a U.S. citizen 
was one of the few avenues open to racial Chinese. 
Beyond admissibility per se, there was a split in the reported decisions on the 
weight of Chinese testimony, whether Chinese testimony should be treated with 
suspicion. A number of courts offered stirring defenses of impartial justice: The 
Fifth Circuit, for example, reversed a district court’s deportation order and granted 
relief to a Chinese person, explaining: 
It is only by arbitrarily rejecting the uncontradicted testimony that the 
order of deportation can be sustained. 
  The same fairness and impartiality should govern in considering and 
weighing the testimony of persons of Chinese descent who claim to be 
citizens of this country as are given to the testimony of any other class of 
witnesses.64 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that: 
[A] court is not at liberty to arbitrarily and without reason reject or 
discredit the testimony of a witness upon the ground that he is a 
Chinaman, an Indian, a negro, or a white man. All people, without regard 
to their race, color, creed, or country, whether rich or poor, stand equal 
before the law. It is the duty of the courts to exercise their best judgment, 
not their will, whim, or caprice, in passing upon the credibility of every 
witness.65 
 
63. Louie Dai v. United States, 238 F. 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1916) (“Unless disqualified by provisions 
of the act, Chinese persons are competent witnesses. The statute in no place disqualified them. They 
may testify in any number to any fact. The law simply limits their number as witnesses to one fact, 
and provides, that as to that fact, testimony shall not be conclusive unless it include [sic] the 
testimony of a witness other than Chinese. That fact is the residence of laborers, and does not,  
by expression or necessary implication, extend to the fact of the occupation of merchants. We are 
therefore of opinion that the evidence of the defendant’s mercantile status is not insufficient because 
it consisted wholly of the testimony of Chinese witnesses.”); see also United States v. Quong Chee,  
89 P. 525, 530 (Ariz. 1907) (“The issue presented was therefore his right to remain. The obligation to 
establish such right ‘by affirmative evidence to the satisfaction of such judge.’ [sic] would entitle him 
to the introduction of any affirmative evidence necessary thereto, and is not analogous to the 
procedure upon his offering to land from the vessel upon his re-entry.”). 
64. Chin Hing v. United States, 24 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1928); see also Lo Kee v. United 
States, 31 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1929); Gee Cue Beng v. United States, 184 F. 383, 385 (5th Cir. 
1911) (“Counsel for the United States . . . contend[s] that the commissioner need not believe a 
Chinese witness in a Chinese deportation proceeding when he sees him, and has an opportunity to 
judge of his credibility. Even if we were disposed to agree with counsel that United States 
commissioners may disregard evidence in cases where only the liberty of a Chinese person is involved, 
it would be of no avail here unless we should go further and impute perjury, not only to the appellant, 
but to some five unimpeached witnesses, including a white citizen, and at least one government 
witness; and we are not disposed to here indorse such contention.”). 
65. Woey Ho v. United States, 109 F. 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1901). Similarly, the court in United 
States v. Lee Huen, 118 F. 442, 463 (N.D.N.Y. 1902) wrote: 
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Nevertheless, as in the state courts,66 federal courts deciding immigration 
cases frequently noted the race of witnesses,67 indicating that the testimony of 
whites was regarded as being particularly credible. This included the U.S. Supreme 
Court. For example, in Kwock Jan Fat v. White,68 a person of Chinese ancestry 
claimed derivative U.S. citizenship so that there was no technical prohibition on 
testimony of witnesses other than Chinese. But the Court’s opinion in the 
applicant’s favor recited no less than nine times that the testimony of “three white 
witnesses” (or some variation) supported the claim.69 
Moreover, even courts recognizing formal competency as to most issues 
 
This court cannot assent to the proposition that in one of these cases a witness for the 
person sought to be deported is interested merely because he is a Chinese person. Such a 
rule would make most witnesses in a court of justice interested witnesses, and, if interest 
alone justifies the court in refusing credence to the testimony of a witness, then many in 
every trial would be more or less discredited by reason of mere national kinship, and the 
court or jury, as the case might be, would be at liberty to refuse to be bound by their 
testimony when testifying in favor of a party of their own nationality. There is no rule of 
law that justifies the assumption that a Chinese person is more interested in his 
countrymen than is a person of some other nationality in his. A Yankee may testify for a 
Yankee, but he is not therefore interested. An Irishman may testify for an Irishman,  
an Englishman for an Englishman, a German for a German; but such witnesses are not,  
in the eye of the law, interested. No discredit can legally attach to the testimony of a 
person because he gives his evidence in behalf of a party belonging to his own nationality. 
66. See, e.g., People v. Chin Non, 80 P. 681, 682 (Cal. 1905); People v. Fong Sing, 175 P. 911, 
914 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918); People v. Ah Wing, 169 P. 402, 405 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); State  
v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 92–93 (1879); see also People v. Foo, 44 P. 453, 455–56 (Cal. 1896); People 
v. Un Dong, 39 P. 12, 13 (Cal. 1895); People v. Green, 34 P. 231, 232 (Cal. 1893); People v. Singh, 53 
P.2d 403, 405 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). 
67. See, e.g., Ng Heu Yim v. Bonham, 79 F.2d 655, 656 (9th Cir. 1935) (holding that, although 
the “white witness [was] of good character and unquestioned veracity,” the witness’s testimony that 
the Chinese person “look[ed] like” a boy he had known twenty years before was insufficient to 
warrant reversal of administrative finding); Lo Kee, 31 F.2d at 407 (“Three white witnesses testified 
that they had known Lo Kee in New Orleans from 8 to 14 years, and that he was a man of good 
character.”); Chan Sing v. Nagle, 22 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1927) (“In support of the application, the 
testimony of four white witnesses was also received.”); Louie Dai, 238 F. at 70 (3d Cir. 1916) 
(recognizing the critical fact of merchant status was supported by “four white witnesses and one 
Chinese witness, who testified that they had known him as a resident of Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, 
engaged in the laundry business”); Moy Wing Sun v. Prentis, 234 F. 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1916) (“Five 
white witnesses connected with a Sunday school in Chicago testified to petitioner’s attendance at the 
Sunday school since about the middle of 1912 . . . .”); United States v. Lui Lim, 4 F. Supp. 873, 875 
(D. Id. 1933) (“W. T. Brown, a white person and a native of the United States, testified that the 
defendant and his uncle came to Boise, Idaho, some time between 1891 and 1895 . . . .”); In re Chu 
Poy, 81 F. 826, 829 (N.D. Oh. 1897) (denying a deportation order on the ground that the defendant 
was not a legitimate merchant, and explaining that “[t]he story which he and his Chinese witnesses tell 
about his mercantile employments is wholly consistent with what we know about him from the white 
witnesses”). 
68. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). 
69. Id. at 455 (“three white men”); id. (“[T]hree white witnesses are representative men of this 
town and would have no motive in misstating the facts.”); id. at 457 (“three white witnesses called by 
petitioner”); id. at 460 (“testimony of three white witnesses”); id. (“three white witnesses from 
Monterey”); id. at 461 (“three credible white witnesses”); id. (“the three white witnesses are 
representative men of this town”); id. (“the white witnesses . . . are men of standing in this town”);  
id. at 462 (“Michaelis, Ortins and another important white witness”). 
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could still set high barriers for Chinese testimony. It is fair to say that many courts 
treated Chinese testimony as suspect. One U.S. district court judge explained that 
Congress has not . . . enacted that, when a person of Chinese descent 
claims to have been born in the United States, he must establish such fact 
by testimony of witnesses other than Chinese. This omission cannot be 
supplied by the courts, and therefore Chinese persons are competent 
witnesses in cases of this character . . . .70 
However, there was bitterness to go along with the sweet: 
[W]here only this class of witnesses testify that the Chinese person . . . is 
a native of this country, unless the court is fully satisfied of the truth of 
such testimony, its finding should follow the presumption that a Chinese 
person coming from China, and seeking to land in the United States, is an 
alien, and not a native-born citizen . . . .71 
Another group of courts treated Chinese testimony as formally suspect.  
A U.S. district court judge in New York explained: “If Chinese witnesses, 
unimpeached, except by their appearance and manner of testifying, are to be 
believed and their testimony accepted, all Chinese persons desiring to enter the 
United States will set our exclusion laws at defiance. It is not necessary to 
comment on this class of testimony.”72 
A U.S. district court judge in Oregon denied an application for readmission 
of a person claiming native citizenship based on Chinese testimony alone. In this 
class of cases, the Chinese Exclusion Act did not require white witnesses. Yet, the 
court ruled: “I am not willing to establish the precedent of admitting Chinese 
persons, who have admittedly remained out of the country for so great a length of 
time, unless some white witness, or some fact not depending upon Chinese 
testimony, corroborates the testimony of the Chinese witnesses . . . .”73 He 
rejected the argument that exclusion of a U.S. citizen was unfair: “Those who 
leave the country when infants must not expect to gain ready readmission after 
they have, in effect, reached maturity. If satisfactory proof of their right to land is 
not possible in such a case, the fault is theirs.”74 
This holding is remarkably unsympathetic in that it holds infants to a high 
standard of foresight and responsibility. And yet, it is hard to accuse the judge of 
faithlessness to the policy of the Chinese Exclusion Act.75 Judicial defenders of 
 
70. In re Jew Wong Loy, 91 F. 240, 243 (N.D. Cal. 1898). 
71. Id. 
72. United States v. Chu King Foon, 179 F. 995, 997 (N.D.N.Y. 1910). 
73. In re Louie You, 97 F. 580, 581 (D. Or. 1899). 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States ex rel. Buchsbaum, 152 F. 346, 352 (3d Cir. 1907) 
(“[C]ases arising under the Chinese exclusion acts are sui generis, involving the judicial or 
administrative enforcement of a particular policy on the part of the United States having as its object 
the prevention of competition between Chinese labor and other labor in this country. There, contrary 
to the general rules of evidence, prima facie presumptions are indulged against the Chinaman, and it 
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impartial justice, who insisted that Chinese testimony could be sufficient when the 
law did not exclude it, ignored rather than reconciled the terms of the law they 
were applying. One might have asked these judges why the law would exclude 
Chinese, prohibit their naturalization, and treat their testimony as inadmissible in 
several important contexts if they were racial equals. It is hard to explain why 
Congress would impose those burdens if it regarded the mistaken deportation of a 
U.S. citizen or a lawful immigrant of Asian ancestry as equivalent to the 
deportation of a U.S. citizen or immigrant of what the law treated as a more 
desirable race. Accordingly, the suspicion of Chinese testimony seems no more or 
less fair than the underlying policy of racial exclusion. 
II. THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF FOREIGNNESS 
A. The Racial Presumption in Deportation Cases 
The Chinese Exclusion Act embodied a major idea, namely that Chinese 
were undesirable immigrants. It also contained a number of subsidiary 
presumptions designed to carry out the exclusion. One notable presumption is a 
provision of the Geary Act, passed in 1892, placing the burden of proving lawful 
presence on all persons of Chinese ancestry.76 That is, even though persons of 
Chinese ancestry born in the United States were U.S. citizens,77 all racial Chinese 
were nevertheless presumptively foreign. 
The statute provided “[t]hat any Chinese person or person of Chinese 
descent arrested under the provisions of this act . . . shall be adjudged to be 
unlawfully within the United States, unless such person shall establish by 
affirmative proof . . . his lawful right to remain in the United States.”78 The 
Supreme Court held that this statute applied to racial Chinese in the United States 
claiming to be U.S. citizens.79 As a result, any person of apparent Chinese ancestry 
 
may be that the principles of statutory construction properly may be applied to the Chinese exclusion 
acts in a manner somewhat different from that in which they are applicable . . . [such as] other statutes 
in pari materia.”); United States v. Yong Yew, 83 F. 832, 837–38 (E.D. Mo. 1897) (“Again, 
considering the public policy of the United States, as asserted and assented to in the several treaties 
already referred to between the United States and China, and the repeated and emphatic declarations 
of such policy by the congress of the United States, . . . I am disposed to so rule this case as to really 
subserve that policy. Chinese labor and Chinese civilization are not wanted in this country . . . .”); see 
also United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 78 (1957) (rejecting a claim that 
“the Board applied an improper standard in exercising its discretion when . . . it took into account the 
congressional policy underlying the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the latter being 
concededly inapplicable to this case”). 
76. Geary Act, ch. 60, § 3, 27 Stat. 25, 25 (1892) (repealed 1943). 
77. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898). 
78. Geary Act § 3. 
79. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 89 (1934) (quoting Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 
186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902) (“The inestimable heritage of citizenship is not to be conceded to those who 
seek to avail themselves of it under pressure of a particular exigency, without being able to show that 
it was ever possessed.”)). In 1922, the Supreme Court had recognized that there was a split in 
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could be seized and deported if he or she could not prove U.S. citizenship or 
other lawful statuses, such as a merchant status or entry prior to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act. 
A federal statute placed the burden on all aliens to show admissibility and 
lawful admission. This functionally extended the presumption of deportability to 
all Asians, who were generally inadmissible after 1924 because of their racial 
ineligibility to citizenship.80 Accordingly, the position of all Asians in the United 
States was precarious: at any moment they could be called upon to prove 
citizenship or lawful entry on pain of deportation because their race itself was 
evidence of deportability. The rule was different with non-Asians; the United 
States bore the burden of first proving alienage, foreign birth, or citizenship 
before a non-Asian being deported had the obligation to prove legal status.81 As 
the Supreme Court explained, “[e]xcept in case of Chinese, or other Asiatics, 
alienage is a condition, not a cause, of deportation.”82 
The presumption of foreignness extended to the idea that all persons of 
Chinese racial ancestry would be treated as if they were from China even if they 
were natives and citizens of some other country.83 People of Chinese ancestry 
subject to deportation who wanted to be sent somewhere other than China bore 
the burden of showing that they were citizens or subjects of a country other than 
China,84 and, even if they did, the statute provided that they would nevertheless be 
deported to China if their actual country of citizenship or residence charged a fee 
 
authority in the lower courts, notwithstanding Chin Bak Kan. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 283 
n.1 (1922). This doubt was dispelled by Morrison. 
 Note that this presumption was not a “Thayer” presumption, which dissipated as soon as some 
evidence to the contrary was introduced. It was a “Morgan” presumption, shifting the burden of 
persuasion. See MIGUEL A. MÉNDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL 
RULES 735–37, 739 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining the differences between the Thayer and Morgan 
presumptions). 
80. 8 U.S.C. § 221 (1925) (repealed 1952); Tsugio Myazono v. Carr, 53 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 
1931) (placing the burden of proof on a Japanese person claiming to be U.S. citizen); see also Kishan 
Singh v. Carr, 88 F.2d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 1937) (placing the burden on an Asian Indian to prove his 
entry into the United States before the effective date of a prohibition on Asian immigration). 
81. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923) (“It is true that alienage 
is a jurisdictional fact; and that an order of deportation must be predicated upon a finding of that fact. 
It is true that the burden of proving alienage rests upon the Government. For the statutory provision 
which puts upon the person arrested in deportation proceedings the burden of establishing his right 
to remain in this country applies only to persons of the Chinese race . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
82. Id. at 157. 
83. Geary Act § 2 (designating China as the default deportation destination for “any Chinese 
person or person of Chinese descent,” particularly if the alternative country to which the person 
claimed citizenship required a deportation tax). 
84. United States v. Sing Lee, 125 F. 627, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1903) (“The burden of proof in this 
class of cases, both as to the right to remain within the United States and the right of removal to a 
country other than China, rests upon the accused.”). 
2013] “A CHINAMAN’S CHANCE” IN COURT 981 
 
for their return.85 This, of course, would be a great hardship for a person of 
Chinese ancestry from Canada, Mexico or some other place.86 
The presumption of foreignness in the immigration context did not rest 
entirely upon the statute; some courts applied it based on general principles.87 For 
example, a U.S. district court judge from Washington state concluded: “There is a 
natural presumption that a person of the Mongolian race, coming to this country 
from China, is an alien; and to overcome that presumption . . . convincing 
evidence is essential.”88 The judge explained that when dealing with 
such a person, he is himself an exhibit, his language, manners, and 
physical appearance must be considered as evidence tending to prove his 
alienage, and without evidence sufficient to create a belief that such a 
person is, notwithstanding his alien parentage, a citizen by birth, the 
natural presumption merges into a legal conclusion.89 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with this approach to determining citizenship, affirming 
a deportation order in part because the litigant’s “personal appearance, indicat[ed] 
by his dress, physiognomy, and queue, that he was a Chinaman.”90 
B. The Burden of Proof in Citizenship Cases 
A number of courts, following a 1914 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, held that Chinese persons claiming to be U.S. citizens 
should be held to a higher standard of proof than the ordinary civil preponderance 
of the evidence: “[T]here is a natural presumption that a person of the Mongolian 
race is an alien, and it is essential that the evidence to overcome it and to show 
that the man is entitled to the privileges of citizenship in the United States should 
be clear and convincing.”91 
In 1954, the federal courts issued a series of decisions representing an 
important milestone in the end of special treatment of Asian litigants in 
 
85. United States v. Yuen Pak Sune, 183 F. 260, 266–67 (N.D.N.Y. 1910) (ordering 
deportation to China because Canada had a Chinese head tax), aff’d, 191 F. 825 (2d Cir. 1911). 
86. This problem was repeated during a later period when the United States had no diplomatic 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China and people born in mainland China faced 
deportation to places they had never been. See Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 375 U.S. 955, 955–56 (1963) 
(Douglas J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
87. See Ex parte Lung Wing Wun, 161 F. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1908). 
88. Id. at 212–13. 
89. Id. at 213. 
90. Low Foon Yin v. U.S. Immigration Comm’r, 145 F. 791, 797–98 (9th Cir. 1906). 
91. Lee Sim v. United States, 218 F. 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1914); see also Lee Lew You v. United 
States, 230 F. 820, 821 (2d Cir. 1916) (“The presumption that a person of the Mongolian race is not a 
citizen is materially strengthened when he seeks to enter the country in so clandestine a manner.”);  
Ly Shew v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 50, 58–59 (N.D. Cal. 1953), vacated sub nom. Ly Shew v. Dulles, 219 
F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1954); Ex parte Chin Him, 227 F. 131, 133–34 (W.D.N.Y. 1915) (following Lee 
Sim); Ex parte Lung Wing Wun, 161 F. at 212–13. 
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immigration cases. In 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Act had been repealed,92 so the 
“credible white witness” regime was gone. In 1952, Congress eliminated racial 
restrictions on naturalization and the prohibition on immigration of people of 
Asian racial background, although only tiny numbers were allowed in until 1965.93 
As one court explained: 
In the past, applicants . . . had a substantial motive, perhaps, to present 
fraudulent claims, because the Chinese Exclusion Act barred all alien 
Chinese from admission to the United States, and the only manner in 
which a person of the Chinese race could enter was by proving 
citizenship of the United States. This motive no longer exists, because 
under the present law persons of the Chinese race are not excluded from 
entry.94 
For these reasons, the particular imperatives of suspicion of Chinese testimony 
had diminished, although they had not dissipated entirely. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that in 1954, the year of Brown v. Board of 
Education,95 the underlying principles of jurisprudence—as well as the 
practicalities—had changed. A unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit rejected 
the cases holding that Chinese claimants to citizenship were required to prove 
their status by clear and convincing evidence: 
The Court of Appeals in Mar Gong v. Brownell, in repudiating this theory 
stated: “We recognize all that may be said with respect to the necessity of 
the court guarding against imposition, but we also are of the view that no 
special quantum of proof should be exacted from any person claiming 
American citizenship merely because of his racial origin.” We agree with 
this statement but think it could well be expressed in more emphatic 
language. We would be much chagrined to think that the adjudication of 
an asserted right in the courts of this country was dependent in the 
slightest degree upon the national origin of the party involved. To think 
otherwise is to countenance discrimination in the courts, the one certain 
place where it should be unknown.96 
Today, it would be shocking for the Department of Justice to argue, as it did in 
1954, that testimony should be reviewed with suspicion based on race, and there 
are many cases holding that it is erroneous to do so.97 
 
92. Magnuson Act, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
subsequent amendments to it). 
93. Chin, Civil Rights Revolution, supra note 2, at 291, 298. 
94. Lou Goon Hop v. Dulles, 119 F. Supp. 808, 810 (D.D.C. 1954). 
95. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
96. Lee Wing Hong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 1954) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Mar Gong v. Brownell, 209 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1954)); see also Ly Shew, 219 F.2d at 416; Wong 
Fon Haw v. Dulles, 125 F. Supp. 658, 659 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
97. See, e.g., Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]his is the rare case 
where remand is required because of the IJ’s apparent bias and hostility toward Huang. The hearings 
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The Seventh Circuit’s stirring suggestion in Mar Gong v. Brownell that 
discrimination should be unknown to federal courts was necessarily aspirational 
where substantive federal immigration law drew lines on the basis of race until 
1965 and the federal courts administered them.98 Accordingly, it could not be 
literally true that courts treated people of different races equally. Nevertheless, the 
law was headed in the direction of equality, and many courts were not eager to 
embrace explicit racial discrimination if there was some way to ameliorate it. 
C. The Racial Presumption in Alien Land Cases 
In the two decisions in Morrison v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court 
approved extending the presumption of foreignness beyond the immigration 
context.99 Even though the cases involved criminal prosecutions, the justices 
unanimously held that the law could presume persons of Asian racial ancestry 
found in the United States were aliens and place the burden on them to prove 
otherwise.100 
The cases dealt with California’s anti-Asian alien land law.101 The alien land 
laws of California and other states built on federal naturalization laws prohibiting 
or restricting the naturalization of Asians. Asian immigrants were “aliens ineligible 
to citizenship.”102 Fifteen states took advantage of this classification to prohibit 
aliens ineligible to citizenship from owning or possessing agricultural property or 
certain other forms of real property.103 Many, including California, enforced the 
prohibition through criminal sanctions. 
 
included several instances of questioning by the IJ that were at least inappropriate and at worst 
indicative of bias against Chinese witnesses.”). 
98. See, e.g., Au Wee Sheung v. United States, 44 F.2d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 1930) (upholding a 
deportation order in spite of an illegal arrest and the appellant’s claim of U.S. citizenship); Moy Guey 
Lum v. United States, 211 F. 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1914) (“Under the facts of the present case, we are 
unable to say that the appellant has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was entitled to remain 
in the United States.”); Fong Gum Tong v. United States, 192 F. 320, 320–21 (7th Cir. 1911) 
(upholding a deportation order, despite the testimony of two Chinese witnesses that the appellant was 
born in the United States). 
99. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92–96 (1934), aff’g 22 P.2d 718 (Cal. 1933); Morrison 
v. California, 288 U.S. 591 (1933) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 13 P.2d 800 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); 
see also infra note 111. 
100. See Morrison, 291 U.S. at 82, 87–88 (1934). 
101. See generally Anti-Alien Land Legislation, 31 YALE L.J. 299, 299–305 (1922) (surveying anti-
alien land laws’ prevalence and the contemporaneous legal issues they raise); Charles Wallace Collins, 
Will the California Alien Land Law Stand the Test of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 23 YALE L.J. 330 (1914) 
(examining California’s anti-alien land law and the grounds upon which it may be constitutionally 
challenged in the future); The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 YALE L.J. 1017, 1018–19, 1022–24, 
1030–31 (1947) (discussing California anti-Asian alien land law’s historical application up until and 
after Morrison.). 
102. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 185, §§ 11(d), 13(c), 28(c), 43 Stat. 153, 159, 162, 168. 
103. See generally Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as 
a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 37 n.4, 38–40, 55–60 (1998) (identifying state anti-alien land 
laws upheld by the Supreme Court); Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California 
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1. Evidence of Race Shifts the Burden to Prove Citizenship 
To prevent Asian control of land through straw owners and other 
stratagems, in 1927, California enacted section 9b of the alien land law, stating 
that, if the State offered, among other evidence, “proof that the defendant is a 
member of a race ineligible to citizenship . . . , [there shall be] a prima facie 
presumption of ineligibility to citizenship of such defendant.”104 The burden of 
proving citizenship “or eligibility to citizenship . . . shall thereupon devolve upon 
such defendant.”105 Oregon adopted a similar statute during World War II.106 
Accordingly, under certain circumstances, engaging in otherwise innocent 
conduct, such as picking apples, became presumptively criminal solely because it 
was being done by a person of apparent Asian ancestry. Once the State proved 
race, the statute shifted the burden to defendants to prove their innocence that 
they were not racially Asian or that they held U.S. citizenship by birth. In the 
absence of persuading the fact finder, persons of Asian ancestry would be 
convicted of a crime. Of course, given the possibility of racial prejudice among 
jurors and the impossibility of perfect jury fact-finding, under this scheme, a U.S. 
citizen might erroneously be convicted. 
The California Supreme Court found the statute unobjectionable: “[C]ourts 
cannot put aside the historical controversies which preceded the adoption of the 
Alien Land Acts and the reasons which impelled their adoption.”107 The court 
observed that the land laws “so directly affect national safety.”108 This may have 
been a reference to an earlier decision which held, citing the U.S. Supreme Court, 
that “[i]f one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the 
realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the 
ownership [or possession] of noncitizens.”109 
The social segregation of Asian races, the California Supreme Court 
explained, necessitated the presumption because other forms of proof were likely 
to be unavailing. The court noted the difficulties in enforcing the acts, which 
 
and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 7, 7 nn. 3–6, 8 nn. 7–16, 23–24 (1947) (comparing state 
treatment of landownership with respect to Asians); see also IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 
REVIEW ASS’N ALIEN LAND LAW PROJECT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA RECOMMENDING REPEAL OF THE RACIALLY 
DISCRIMINATORY ALIEN LAND PROVISION OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION (Dec. 2000), reprinted 
in 22 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY L. REV. 749, 749–61 (2001) (analyzing the history and effect of 
Florida’s anti-alien land law). 
104. People v. Osaki, 278 P. 252, 252 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929). 
105. Act of July 29, 1927, ch. 528, § 9 (b), 1927 Cal. Stat. 880, 881. This presumption applied 
in civil cases as well. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1983 (1927) (repealed 1965); Act of Apr. 25, 1927, ch. 
244, § 1, 1927 Cal. Stat 434 (repealed 1955). 
106. The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, supra note 101, at 1024–25. 
107. People v. Osaki, 286 P. 1025, 1035 (Cal. 1930). 
108. Id. at 1027. 
109. Ex parte Ramirez, 226 P. 914, 920 (Cal. 1924) (quoting Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 
197, 220–21 (1923)). 
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arise in no small measure from the difficulty of identifying one member 
of the several ineligible alien races from another by reason of racial 
similitudes. They speak in Oriental languages which have no basic 
relation or resemblance to the English or Latin languages, and, because of 
their Oriental forms of worship and their lack of knowledge of and 
interest in our national and ancestral traditions and future objectives, they 
live in groups or communities having no social, civic, or political 
intercourse with the citizens of the country, or those eligible to become 
citizens, hedged in by impenetrable privacy and secrecy as to their status 
as citizens and affairs generally to a degree that nowhere else obtains.110 
In the aforementioned pair of cases that arose from the same prosecution 
and were both decided under the name Morrison v. California, the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously agreed with the California Supreme Court that the racial 
presumption was constitutional.111 The Court explained that once the State proved 
that the defendant was a member of an ineligible race, it was reasonable to shift 
the burden to the defendant to prove citizenship: 
In the vast majority of cases, he could do this without trouble if his claim 
of citizenship was honest. The People, on the other hand, if forced to 
disprove his claim, would be relatively helpless. In all likelihood his life 
history would be known only to himself and at times to relatives or 
intimates unwilling to speak against him.112 
Quoting a decision based on the Chinese Exclusion Act where the Court 
held that a racial Chinese person in deportation proceedings could be compelled 
to prove citizenship, the Court said: “The inestimable heritage of citizenship is not 
to be conceded to those who seek to avail themselves of it under pressure of a 
particular exigency, without being able to show that it was ever possessed.”113 
Therefore, “casting upon a Japanese defendant the burden of proving citizenship 
after proof of his race had been given by the state was not an impairment of his 
immunities under the federal constitution.”114 
The Court’s claim that citizenship could be proved “without trouble” was 
disingenuous. The alien land laws existed only because of anti-Asian racial 
hostility. In addition, there was a long tradition of suspicion of Asian testimony in 
both California and federal law, the latter of which had been upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. A U.S. citizen of Asian ancestry, then, might have found the 
protection of a jury trial to be cold comfort. The Court seemed to accept the 
 
110. Osaki, 286 P. at 1035–36. 
111. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1934), aff’g 22 P.2d 718 (Cal. 1933); Morrison 
v. California, 288 U.S. 591 (1933) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 13 P.2d 800 (Cal. App. 1932). 
Dismissals for want of a substantial federal question are decisions on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 
422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). 
112. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88. 
113. Id. at 89 (quoting Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902)). 
114. Id. 
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doubtful idea that it is possible to fairly apply in an individual case a law that is 
unfair in its nature because it is based on negative beliefs about, and designed to 
disadvantage, the particular group of which the individual is a member. 
Placing the burden of proof on the alleged alien is also unfair. In Kwock Jan 
Fat v. White,115 the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is better that many Chinese 
immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of 
the United States should be permanently excluded from his country.”116 But the 
sentiment that it is worse to deport (or convict) a U.S. citizen than it is to allow a 
noncitizen to avoid liability is simply incompatible with the requirement that racial 
Asians claiming to be U.S. citizens bear the burden of proving citizenship.117  
By definition, the standard reflects a slight preference for erroneous findings 
against the individual. Thus, this passage could represent the Court’s own point of 
view, but it is not compatible with the Chinese Exclusion Act that it deemed 
constitutional and enforced for many decades. 
2. Mere Accusation Cannot Shift the Burden to Prove Citizenship 
The Supreme Court struck down a presumption in section 9a of California’s 
law, which shifted the burden of proving racial eligibility to the defendants based 
on the State’s mere allegation that an ineligible alien was occupying land without 
requiring any proof of race. One of the defendants in Morrison v. California, 
Morrison, was a Caucasian citizen charged with conspiracy to violate the land laws 
by selling to a person of an ineligible race. The Court held that California had to 
prove that the seller actually knew the person to whom he was selling land was an 
ineligible alien. The Court said: 
He may never have seen [the buyer] . . . . He may have made his 
agreement by an agent or over the telephone or by writings delivered 
through the mails. Even if lessor and lessee came together face to face, 
there is nothing to show whether [the buyer] was a Japanese of the full 
blood, whose race would have been apparent to any one looking at him. 
Moreover, if his race was apparent, he may still have been a citizen . . . .118 
In essence, the Court refused to take a chance that a Caucasian would be 
imprisoned for insufficient racial vigilance. 
 
115. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). 
116. Id. at 464. This phrase echoes the famous criminal dictum. See Coffin v. United States, 
156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (“Blackstone (1753–1765) maintains that ‘the law holds that it is better that 
ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.’”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *358). 
117. Assuming that the burden on racial Chinese was proof to a preponderance of the 
evidence, that would suggest that Congress favored neither erroneous deportation of a U.S. citizen of 
Chinese ancestry, nor erroneous non-deportation of an unauthorized Chinese person, except where 
the evidence was in equipoise, in which case Congress put the risk of error on the claimant. See, e.g., 
Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997). 
118. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92–93 (1934). 
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The Court also held the presumption of section 9a unconstitutional as to the 
allegedly ineligible buyer; here as well, the State had to prove the buyer’s racial 
ineligibility.119 The buyer, unlike the seller, would almost certainly have seen 
herself in the mirror at some point, so would know whether she appeared to be 
Asian or not. Nevertheless, the Court found that there was a lack of need to 
prosecute by presumption rather than direct evidence coupled with a risk of 
injustice. 
The lack of need flowed from the fact that generally, “the race of a Japanese 
or Chinaman will be known to any one who looks at him. . . . The triers of the 
facts will look upon the defendant . . . and will draw their own conclusions.”120 
The State can also “call witnesses familiar with the characteristics of the race, who 
will state his racial origin.”121 So, in the ordinary prosecution, there is no need for 
the State to dispense with direct evidence of the race of a defendant. 
The “probability of injustice to the accused” flowed from the fact that aliens 
who were in fact ineligible might not realize it, because their prohibited racial 
admixture was too small. “One whose racial origins are so blended as to be not 
discoverable at sight will often be unaware of them. If he can state nothing but his 
ignorance, he has not sustained the burden of proving eligibility, and must stand 
condemned of crime.”122 Thus, the Court refused to take the risk that a mostly 
white or African person might be convicted of being Asian. For example, “[a] 
laborer, born in Canada, his parents apparently mulattoes, but one of his 
grandparents a Filipino, according to the charge in an indictment, would be 
ignorant in many cases whether he was a Filipino or an African.”123 “There can be 
no escape from hardship and injustice, outweighing many times any procedural 
convenience, unless the burden of persuasion in respect of racial origin is cast 
upon the People.”124 But the Court did not retreat from its holding that, once the 




119. See id. at 93 (classifying the buyer’s disqualification as “a mere presumption”). 
120. Id. at 94. 
121. Id. In the Court’s world, evidently there was a corps of experts who could look at people 
and identify their race. Cf. How to Tell Japs from the Chinese: Angry Citizens Victimize Allies with Emotional 
Outburst at Enemy, LIFE, Dec. 22, 1941, at 81–82 (addressing Americans’ “distressing ignorance . . . on 
how to tell” a person’s racial and ethnic background visually). 
122. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 94. 
123. Id. at 95. 
124. Id. at 96. 
125. Id. at 87–88. 
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D. The End, and Continuation, of Race-Based Evidence 
Ultimately, the special need for evidentiary use of Asian appearance became 
unnecessary. Racial restrictions on naturalization terminated in 1952.126 In 
addition, the alien land laws were declared unconstitutional by several state 
supreme courts,127 and U.S. Supreme Court decisions cast some doubt on them.128 
Asian race thus eventually lost its substantive relevance both to state laws and 
federal immigration law. 
Another legal doctrine still in existence, though, echoes this regime. In United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,129 the Supreme Court held that “apparent Mexican ancestry” 
could be used as a factor in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion 
for the border patrol to stop a person near the Mexican border on suspicion that 
they had entered unlawfully: “The likelihood that any given person of Mexican 
ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor,” 
although the Court made clear that race was insufficient standing alone to justify a 
stop.130 Even today, then, law enforcement authorities regularly use race as 
evidence of guilt, at least for purposes of stops and arrests.131 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of Asians with racial rules of evidence has a number of 
interesting features. 
One is the struggle of judges to adhere to principles of equal justice while 
applying an inherently racist law. Notwithstanding the discriminatory policy of the 
law, many judges ruled in favor of Asians in particular cases. More interestingly, 
many insisted that individual Asians were to be judged as individuals, not simply as 
members of a race deemed undesirable. But none of these courts, apparently, ever 
explained how the principle that the rights of Asians were as weighty as those of 
 
126. See Chin, Civil Rights Revolution, supra note 2, at 282 (citing Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175; id. § 311, 66 Stat. at 239). 
127. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 630 (Cal. 1952); State v. Oakland, 287 P.2d 39, 42 (Mont. 
1955); Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 583 (Or. 1949). 
128. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 421–22 (1948) (striking down a 
California fishing law that discriminated against “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” but distinguishing, 
rather than overruling, alien land law cases); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–45 (1948) 
(invalidating the presumption that a land purchase by a U.S. citizen minor with ineligible parents was 
fraudulent); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, 
Race and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 999–1007 (2010). 
129. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
130. Id. at 885–87. 
131. See Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070,  
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 67–70 (2010); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the 
Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007, 1043, 1046–47, 1064–65 (2010); see also Gabriel J. Chin 
& Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling’s Unlikely Enabler: A High Court Ruling Underpins Ariz. Law, WASH. POST, 
July 13, 2010, at A15. 
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members of any other race could be reconciled with the policy of Asian 
Exclusion, the restriction of their testimony and the presumptions imposed on 
them. The policy of exclusion implied substantively that it would be better were 
the excluded group to be gone. The special evidentiary rules implied that this same 
group were not to be trusted. Either the policy and the rules, on the one hand, or 
the idea that Asians were equal, on the other, had to be incorrect. Given this 
radical dissonance, the defense of impartial justice had to be either less radical 
(because empty) or more radical (because they involved rejection of the anti-Asian 
regime) than the courts let on. 
The cases may also offer support for Derrick Bell’s interest convergence 
thesis,132 which proposes that minorities are more likely to win legal rights when 
granting those rights benefits whites. The reasoning of the courts in many of these 
cases supports the idea of interest convergence. Courts defending Asian rights 
often did so in opinions mentioning the possible impact on whites. When 
California Chief Justice Sawyer deplored the development of criminals who could 
victimize Chinese who could not testify against them, the victimization of Chinese 
was not enough; he feared that “in due time, more hardened and experienced 
reprobates will graduate to exercise their skill upon a wider field of criminal 
enterprise.”133 
Courts also ruled that Asian rights had to be honored in order to protect 
those of whites. For example, a court rejecting the proposition that Chinese were 
interested witnesses in immigration cases noted: 
There is no rule of law that justifies the assumption that a Chinese person 
is more interested in his countrymen than is a person of some other 
nationality in his. A Yankee may testify for a Yankee, but he is not 
therefore interested. An Irishman may testify for an Irishman, an 
Englishman for an Englishman, a German for a German; but such 
witnesses are not, in the eye of the law, interested.134 
And the Court in Morrison v. California struck down section 9b of California’s alien 
land law to protect Caucasian sellers and those of mixed race. If “[t]he admixture 
of oriental blood might be too slight for [a defendant’s] race to be apparent,”135 
then the person may be mostly white or, in fact, entirely white and charged in 
error. The Court found this unacceptable.136 Even when the Asian litigant won, 
the interests of whites were significant or paramount. 
The most important point is the breadth and expansive nature of the regime 
of Asian Exclusion. Although substantive law was very important, evidence 
 
132. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,  
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
133. People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 566, 574 (1867). 
134. United States v. Lee Huen, 118 F. 442, 463 (N.D.N.Y. 1902). 
135. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 95 (1934). 
136. Id. at 95–96.  
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principles both made the substantive laws much harsher and independently 
contributed to negative stereotypes about Asians in the United States, which in 
turn justified further substantive laws. A particularly influential jurisdiction was the 
United States itself, because it extended the idea of Chinese dishonesty to courts 
in all fifty states. Suspicion of Chinese witnesses ultimately extended to all Asians; 
the law implied that the concern, the risk to be regulated, was the race as a whole, 
and not for example, some discrete characteristics of the particular Chinese who 
immigrated to California in the 1860s and 1870s. Under the rationale of People v. 
Hall, Japanese, Koreans, Asian Indians, Filipinos, and other Asians were just as 
“black” as the Chinese in the sense that they were not white.137 When the statutes 
of California and Nevada embraced that principle, they applied based on 
Mongolian or Asiatic race, not to the Chinese alone. 
This unfortunate history of restrictions on Chinese testimony, the alien land 
laws, and racial restrictions on immigration and naturalization are gone. But mere 
repeal of laws and overruling decisions cannot have eliminated the social and 
cultural effects of a body of jurisprudence that was in force in one way or another 
for a full century between 1854 and 1954. 
 
 
137. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404 (1854) (defining “white” as used in the Constitution as 
including Caucasians and excluding all others). 
